Sri Lanka by Walton, Oliver
        
Citation for published version:
Walton, O 2015, Sri Lanka. in MJ Dubnick & DA Bearfield (eds), Encyclopedia of Public Administration and
Public Policy (3rd ed.): 3 volume set. 3rd edn, Routledge, London, U. K.
Publication date:
2015
Document Version
Early version, also known as pre-print
Link to publication
Copyright (2016) From Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Third Edition by Domonic A.
Bearfield and Melvin J. Dubnick. Reproduced by permission of Taylor and Francis Group, LLC, a division of
Informa plc.
This material is strictly for personal use only. For any other use, the user must contact Taylor & Francis directly
at this address: & Francis directly at this address: permissions.mailbox@taylorandfrancis.com. Printing,
photocopying, sharing via any means is a violation of copyright.
University of Bath
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.
Download date: 07. Dec. 2019
Encyclopedia of Public Administration and Public Policy, Second Edition
 
Sri Lanka
--Manuscript Draft--
 
Manuscript Number:
Full Title: Sri Lanka
Short Title: Sri Lanka
Article Type: Entry
Keywords: Sri Lanka, patrimonalism;  economic reform;  social development;  civil war;
corruption;  militarisation;  ethnicity;  peacebuilding
Corresponding Author: Oliver Walton
University of Bath
Bath, UNITED KINGDOM
Corresponding Author Secondary
Information:
Corresponding Author's Institution: University of Bath
Corresponding Author's Secondary
Institution:
First Author: Oliver Walton
First Author Secondary Information:
Order of Authors: Oliver Walton
Order of Authors Secondary Information:
Abstract: Since the end of the civil war in 2009, there has been a marked deterioration in
democratic governance in Sri Lanka, with many commentators describing a shift
towards soft authoritarianism. This chapter explores how Sri Lanka's democratic
malaise has been shaped by its post-independence history. First, it presents a story of
'institutional decay', examining how contemporary problems of ethno-nationalism,
social exclusion and civil war can be clearly traced to the parliamentary system
inherited from the British. Second, it builds on this account by exploring how patterns of
social exclusion and the institutional responses that they prompted were shaped by
broader processes of economic and social development. Third, it describes how
successive state reform efforts have failed to resolve ethnic tensions, and have instead
increased state centralization and entrenched a unitary state model. The chapter
concludes by examining contemporary governance in Sri Lanka, focusing on three
core issues: patrimonialism, militarization, and the limits of liberal civil society.
Suggested Reviewers:
Powered by Editorial Manager® and ProduXion Manager® from Aries Systems Corporation
1 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
Abstract 
 
Since the end of the civil war in 2009, there has been a marked deterioration in democratic 
governance in Sri Lanka, with many commentators describing a shift towards soft 
authoritarianism. This chapter explores how Sri Lanka’s democratic malaise has been shaped by 
its post-independence history. First, it presents a story of ‘institutional decay’, examining how 
contemporary problems of ethno-nationalism, social exclusion and civil war can be clearly traced 
to the parliamentary system inherited from the British. Second, it builds on this account by 
exploring how patterns of social exclusion and the institutional responses that they prompted 
were shaped by broader processes of economic and social development. Third, it describes how 
successive state reform efforts have failed to resolve ethnic tensions, and have instead increased 
state centralization and entrenched a unitary state model. The chapter concludes by examining 
contemporary governance in Sri Lanka, focusing on three core issues: patrimonialism, 
militarization, and the limits of liberal civil society.   
 
Key words: Sri Lanka, patrimonalism, economic reform, social development, civil war, corruption, 
militarization, ethnicity 
 
Introduction 
Despite being a small island state of limited geopolitical importance, Sri Lanka has received considerable 
attention in the wider literature on governance, democracy, and public policy. Much of this interest stems 
from the fact that Sri Lanka’s post-independence history challenges many prevailing orthodoxies relating 
to the relationship between governance, development and violent conflict. While Sri Lanka has been a 
functioning democracy since independence and has achieved high levels of human development, progress 
has been accompanied by a range of social and political problems including social exclusion, clientelism, 
ethnic division and violent conflict. Most strikingly, the case of Sri Lanka illustrates that the establishment 
of democratic institutions does not by itself guarantee a broader transformation towards democratic 
politics.   
 
This chapter sketches the main characteristics of the Sri Lankan polity, and describes the evolution of 
governance and government on the island since independence in 1948. It also reflects on recent trends in 
governance since the end of the war and the defeat of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a 
separatist group that fought a 26-year civil war with the Government of Sri Lanka. While Sri Lanka has 
seen a further erosion of democratic governance since the defeat of the LTTE in 2009, this chapter 
emphasises the continuities between these contemporary problems and more long-standing flaws in Sri 
Lanka’s institutions and political culture.   
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The chapter will be set out as follows. The first section examines the institutions inherited from the 
British and some of the key political developments that followed British rule.  The second section reflects 
on the relationship between governance and economic development in Sri Lanka, highlighting how 
processes of market reform and patterns of state welfarism have shaped wider processes of social 
exclusion and conflict. Section three explores various state reform efforts, including the introduction of 
two new constitutions in 1972 and 1978, and subsequent efforts to devolve power away from the centre. 
Section four reflects on three key contemporary governance issues in Sri Lanka: patrimonalism, 
militarization, and the role of civil society.  
 
Sri Lanka is an ethnically-diverse society. According to the latest census in 2012, the Sinhalese make up 
75% of the population. Sri Lankan Tamils are the largest minority group (11%), followed by Muslims 
(9%) and Indian Tamils (4%). The Sinhalese live mainly in the Southern part of the country. Sri Lankan 
Tamils and Muslims have historically been concentrated in the North and East. These ethnic groups are 
religiously and linguistically distinct - the Sinhalese are mostly Buddhist, while most Tamils are Hindus; 
the Sinhalese speak Sinhala while Tamils and Muslims speak Tamil.  
 
The colonial inheritance 
Sri Lanka’s post-independence history can be read as a failure of the state to reconcile the interests of 
minorities with those of the Sinhalese majority. Bastian [1] argues that this failure occurred at three 
levels: in terms of the failure of the state’s institutions to generate a means of power-sharing between 
ethnic groups, in terms of the state’s identity, and finally in the implementation of public policies.   
On achieving independence in 1948, Sri Lanka inherited a set of functioning democratic institutions based 
on a fully enfranchised electorate, a strong political party system, an efficient civil service, and an 
independent police and judiciary [2]. Despite these apparent strengths, however, the electoral system 
inherited from the British lacked sufficient safeguards to protect the interests and entitlements of 
minority communities.  Although a number of measures were subsequently included in the constitution, 
these proved insufficient in the face of growing pressure from ruling parties, which increasingly sought to 
alter both the identity of the state and the distribution of state resources to the population [3]. Unlike in 
India, where the independence movement had forged political parties around class loyalties, Sri Lanka’s 
post-independence politicians quickly came to rely upon ethno-nationalist forms of political mobilization 
to shore up popular support, with politicians in the South catering to the needs of the Sinhalese majority, 
and Tamil politicians in the North and East looking after Tamil interests.  
 
The rapid escalation of ethno-nationalist forms of political mobilization was intimately linked to the 
system of democratic majoritarianism instituted at independence.  As DeVotta (3) has described, the 
system promoted a pattern of ‘ethnic outbidding’ whereby the major parties in the South of Sri Lanka 
competed to achieve popular status as the defender of Sinhalese interests.  This process began during the 
1956 general election when one of the two main Southern parties – the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - 
3 
 
ran on a ‘Sinhala Only’ platform, seeking to make Sinhala the sole official language.  After the SLFP’s 
election victory this change was passed into law, leading to public protests from Tamils in Colombo.   
 
The language policy formed part of a broader process of Sinhalization of the state since independence.  
Political competition in the South increasingly revolved around the need to rebalance entitlements, and 
these policies were extended into the educational system in the 1970s through the policy of 
‘standardization’, whereby ethnic quotas were introduced in the university and civil service admissions 
process as a means of boosting the representation of marginalised Sinhalese populations in the South.  
Tamils had been disproportionately represented under the British but successive governments took steps 
to boost Sinhalese representation and the proportion of Tamils employed in the civil service fell from 
30% to 5% between 1956 and 1970 [3].    
 
As well as limiting the availability of state resources to minority groups, these policies also contributed to 
a gradual shift in the identity of the state.  The policies of agrarian populism designed to win support from 
the Sinhalese majority were couched in a discourse of Sinhala Buddhist revivalism. These projects also 
involved the resettlement of poor Sinhalese farmers, eroding the electoral influence of the Tamil and 
Muslim communities in the East.  Cultural Sinhalization of the state was accelerated in the 1970s.  In 
1972, Buddhism was made the official state religion and a more prominent place was granted to Buddhist 
cultural symbols and practices in state functions. 
 
Post-independence politics saw a deepening of the state’s patrimonial character whereby elite groups 
maintained power on the basis of their capacity to channel state resources or protection to their 
constituencies, rather than on the basis of performance (4, 5, 6).  Clientelism fuelled discontent amongst 
Sinhala youth in the peripheral rural areas of the South, and contributed to the JVP uprising in 1971 as 
well as the more protracted insurrection of 1986-9.  The steady course of state Sinhalization that followed 
independence encouraged growing political protest from Tamil groups, which by the early 1970s had led 
to the emergence of a number of militant groups.  As will be discussed in subsequent sections, the state’s 
heavy handed response to these uprisings further alienated marginalised groups.  
 
This section has illustrated that many of the contemporary problems of governance facing Sri Lanka 
today are rooted in a long-term process of institutional decay, which can be traced back to the period of 
British rule and the institutions inherited at independence (3). This experience runs counter to 
democratic peace theory and supports the work of authors like Michael Mann, who have identified strong 
links between democratic and violent ethnic cleansing (7).  The next two sections will build on this 
institutional account by exploring first how the evolution of governance in Sri Lanka has been related to 
processes of economic and social development, and second why successive efforts to reform the state 
have been largely unsuccessful.   
 
Post-independence economic and social developments 
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As well as generating important lessons about the potential linkages between democratic institutions and 
social conflict, Sri Lanka has also been an important case study for understanding the potential trade-offs 
between the policy goals of promoting economic growth and improving social welfare. This section will 
examine Sri Lanka’s post-independence development record and explores the complex outcomes of 
development processes for conflict and institutional decay. 
 
Since the 1950s, Sri Lanka has consistently outperformed its South Asian neighbours in health and 
education outcomes.  In 2012, it had the highest life expectancy in the region– 74 years compared with a 
regional average of 68. It also has higher literacy rates – 91% compared with 63% in India and 57% in 
Bangladesh (8, p.113). While much of the academic debate has focused on the social consequences of a 
shift towards welfare statism from the early 1960s, it is important to note that Sri Lanka’s high living 
standards outstripped its neighbours before independence (8, 9). Key features underpinning Sri Lanka’s 
relative success included its long-standing investments in human capital (especially education), its 
tradition of popular participation in politics, its commercialised export sector and efficient though limited 
tax base, and the country’s strategic location in the Indian ocean (10, 11). Sri Lanka’s first governor 
general remarked in 1948 that these conditions made Sri Lanka ‘the best bet in Asia’ (11). These 
promising starting conditions were bolstered by a range of social welfare policies introduced after 
independence which included heavily subsidised rice, free education to university level and subsidised 
public transport.  
 
Sri Lanka’s economic and social development since independence has often been framed as a story of 
‘missed opportunities’ (2). Although Sri Lanka’s record in achieving high rates of literacy and life 
expectancy remains impressive, there is a widespread sense that its record of poverty reduction and 
economic growth has been disappointing. Whilst not far below the regional average between 1970 and 
1995 (an average rate of 4.5% GDP growth per annum vs. a regional average of 4.9%), this performance 
was nevertheless deemed unsatisfactory given the comparative advantages mentioned above (8). Two 
main factors explain this relative failure: first, flawed and changeable economic policy pursued in the 
1950s, 60s and 70s and second, the broader economic consequences of the civil war that began in 1983 
(8, 11, 12). 
 
Between 1956 and 1976, the government attempted to implement an ambitious programme to transform 
the colonial economy based on exports from the plantation sector through a process of import-
substitution.  This strategy led to the rapid expansion of the state sector and the nationalization of many 
private enterprises.  As well as damaging economic growth, expansion of the state sector allowed pre-
existing patrimonial political relationships to be rapidly extended, increasing social demand for resources 
while simultaneously blocking the path towards upward social mobility for particular opportunities for 
particular social groups (13).  The subsequent stagnation of the economy also thwarted these inflated 
demands and expectations, particularly for the growing mass of educated youth. These problems fed 
directly into several major instances of armed conflict: two youth-led insurgencies organised by the 
Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP – literally ‘National Liberation Front’) - a Marxist youth movement based 
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in the South of the country in 1971 and in the late 1980s; and a protracted war between the government 
of Sri Lanka and the LTTE, which began in 1983 and ended in 2009. 
 
The implementation of a raft of neo-liberal policies in the late 1970s saw a retrenchment of the welfare 
system, which prompted a reversal of some of the human development gains made since independence.  
This process of liberalization led to a brief period of more rapid economic growth before the war began in 
1983. Liberalization also produced a range of new inequalities, which fuelled tensions between various 
societal groups and exacerbated divisions between Sinhalese and Tamil populations. While there is some 
consensus that liberalization contributed to rising social and ethnic tensions, there is considerable 
disagreement about the precise mechanisms that explain this link.  Gunasinghe (14) has argued that 
small-scale Sinhala industrialists were worst hit by economic reforms, fuelling resentments that fed 
directly into the violent retaliation against Tamils and their businesses in 1983.  Others contend that 
radical reforms, and the increasingly authoritarian style of governance used to implement them, 
contributed to growing regional inequality by increasing poverty in the North and East, driving the 
disillusionment of the Tamil minority (15).  Moore (16) describes how these regional inequalities arose 
because liberalization largely benefited the export sector (which was based largely in the South) whilst 
damaging the prices of domestic food crops (which were largely grown in the North).  Dunham and 
Jayasuriya (17) have argued that the rolling back of state welfare programmes ‘remov[ed] supports for 
the poor that may have been badly targeted, costly and ineﬃcient, but . . . were buying social peace’. 
Finally, Rampton and Welikala describe how the opening up of the Sri Lankan economy intensified the 
reproduction of Sinhala nationalism by providing an opportunity to stress potential threats to Sri Lankan 
sovereignty and to reassert traditional forms of national identity (18).   
 
The war itself had important consequences for the economy. In the 1980s and 90s, these inequalities 
were further exacerbated by the military conflict, which stalled economic growth in the North and East 
whilst allowing development to continue in other regions, particularly the Western Province. One study 
estimates that the conflict has slowed economic growth in Sri Lanka by an average of 2% per annum (19).  
This growth was largely restricted to the South West which, barring occasional terrorist attacks, was 
relatively unaffected by the conflict.  By 2005, 50% of Sri Lanka’s GDP was concentrated in the Western 
Province (20). GDP growth has consistently exceeded 4% in the years since the war began.  After the 
setback caused by an LTTE attack on the international airport in 2001, the economy continued to expand 
during the ceasefire and maintained impressive growth rates in 2007 and 2008 (6.8% and 6.0% 
respectively) despite the return to war. Since the end of the war, economic growth has continued at 
roughly the same rate. While the spoils of growth are increasingly spreading to the Northern and Eastern 
provinces, some have argued that economic expansion in these regions has been largely exploitative, with 
new ventures controlled by business interests and powerful political groups from the South (21). 
 
Military spending grew from 1.6% of GDP in 1985 to 6% of GDP in 1996. Income from armed forces 
personnel became a central part of the rural economy as the military expanded to its current size of 
around 300,000 troops.  As the war continued, there has been a gradual accumulation of vested interests 
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in its continuation from both sides (20, 22).  The war permitted a pattern of ‘military fiscalism’ whereby 
the army provided a significant source of jobs for the rural Sinhalese population, offsetting the cuts to 
state employment caused by economic reforms (23). Since the end of the war in 2009, the level of defence 
spending has continued to rise – reaching a new record level of $1.95 billion in 2013 (24). 
 
This section has described the close relationship between violent conflict and wider processes of 
economic and social development. The next section will examine how the processes of social exclusion 
and political marginalization described above have been compounded by a series of institutional changes. 
 
State reform 
State reform since independence can be interpreted in two main ways. First, constitutional reforms 
initiated in the 1970s can be viewed as seeking to promote the cultural and ideological interests of the 
Sinhalese majority, reflecting the emerging political culture of the South.  These reforms have been 
depicted as cementing the interests of Sinhala nationalist groups in an attempt to tighten the grip of 
majority interests over Sri Lanka’s political system (see 25, 26). Second, reform efforts can be seen as 
more pragmatic attempts to address many of the social and economic problems identified in the last 
section, by streamlining decision-making and limiting the influence of certain political groups that were 
undermining Sri Lanka’s long-term economic prospects. 
 
In 1972 a new constitution was introduced which ended Sri Lanka’s constitutional ties with the British 
monarchy. The new constitution reflected the cultural nationalism which had been gradually embedded 
in the political culture since independence (27). It further alienated the Tamil minority by asserting the 
state’s unitary character, cementing Sinhala as the official language of Sri Lanka and inscribing the state’s 
role as the protector of the Buddhist religion. The republican constitution was also more authoritarian in 
character and concentrated state power in the hands of the Prime Minister, the cabinet and the 
Parliament and providing the Prime Minister with wide-ranging new emergency powers.  
 
The highly centralised character of the state was consolidated in a new constitution introduced in 1978. 
This new constitution replaced the ceremonial presidency system established under the 1972 
constitution with a powerful executive presidency modelled on the French system, where the President is 
largely independent from Parliament. This shift to an executive presidency was accompanied by the 
adoption of a new multi-member proportional representation electoral system. These moves were 
justified on the grounds that bold policies were needed to promote rapid economic development and 
break the vested interests that had grown up around Sri Lanka’s political economy since independence 
and entrenched the pattern of state welfarism. Bastian (28) describes how the Prime Minister, JR 
Jayawardene, felt that introducing the executive presidency and a system of proportional representation 
would help to limit the growing influence of ‘intermediate classes’, who had been pushing ‘state capitalist 
policies to their extreme’ (28, p. 207). Another important consequence of the combined presidential and 
proportional representation system has been to make further constitutional reform very difficult to 
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achieve, since obtaining the two thirds majority in parliament required to carry out reforms is more 
challenging under a PR system. This barrier to subsequent constitutional reform was overcome in 2010 
when President Mahinda Rajapakse won a two thirds majority in parliament - riding a wave of popularity 
in the aftermath of his victory over the LTTE.  He introduced the eighteenth amendment which removed 
the two-term presidential limit, permitting him to stand again for presidential office. 
 
In addition to these two major constitutional overhauls, there have been a series of specific efforts to 
reform the constitution with a view to resolving the ethnic conflict. In 1987, the thirteenth amendment to 
the constitution was passed as part of the Indo-Lanka Accord signed by the Sri Lankan and Indian 
governments. It was devised as a solution to the ongoing conflict between the government and the LTTE 
and attempted to devolve power away from the central state by establishing a new system of provincial 
government.  For a number of reasons, the provincial councils have not served as an effective solution to 
the political marginalization of the Tamil minority. First, implementation of the devolution of powers has 
been blocked by politicians at the centre, the bureaucracy and the judiciary. As Uyangoda (25) has argued 
the principle of devolved power clashed both with the bureaucracy’s highly centralised structure and 
with the entrenched nationalist ideology of the unitary state, which is deep-rooted within the civil service. 
The judiciary has also proven highly conservative in its approach to state reform, and has been reluctant 
to rule against the centre in situations where there is a conflict between the exercise of powers by central 
government and the provincial councils (25). Second, as a result of these dynamics, the centre has tended 
to maintain control over the provincial councils, with opposition-led councils receiving fewer resources. 
Third, ironically provincial councils have functioned for a prolonged period in the South of the country, 
while enjoying only a very short-lived existence in the North and East. The Northern Provincial council 
was elected for the first time in 2013, while the Eastern Provincial council has functioned since 2008. 
Fourth, from the outset the thirteenth amendment lacked buy-in from various political constituencies in 
Sri Lanka – it was opposed by Tamil political parties for delivering less than they had hoped, and by 
Sinhala nationalists for violating Sri Lankan sovereignty.  
 
Since the thirteenth amendment was passed, there have been a number of subsequent efforts to resolve 
the ethnic conflict through state reform. A devolution package was proposed in 1994 by the then 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga during a short-lived peace process, but was rejected by the opposition 
United National Party (UNP) in parliament. Another peace process took place between 2002 and 2006, 
facilitated by Norway and backed by four co-chairs (the US, the EU, Japan and the World Bank). The 
process led the LTTE to present for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) – a concrete proposal that 
fell short of their goal of independence for an independent homeland. Despite this progress, the peace 
process broke down as popular support drained away in the South, divisions emerged between the UNP 
and the SLFP, and the Eastern wing of the LTTE broke away. The failure of the peace process was also 
closely linked to growing opposition from Sinhala nationalists who were concerned about the threat to 
the unitary state and what they saw as the excessive role played by outside actors (see 29, 30). The 
incumbent UNP government was defeated in the 2004 parliamentary elections and the SLFP candidate 
Mahinda Rajapakse was elected President in 2005. He immediately distanced himself from the political 
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consensus on conflict resolution that had grown up between the two main political parties in preceding 
years, and asserted his commitment to a unitary state by de-merging the North and Eastern provinces.  
 
Contemporary issues in Sri Lankan governance 
Since the resumption of war in 2006, and throughout the post-war period, Sri Lanka has moved towards a 
more authoritarian system of government (31). This chapter has argued that the current malaise is best 
understood with reference to a long process of ‘institutional decay’, wider processes of social and 
economic development, and a series of flawed attempts to reform state institutions. This final section 
reflects on three key aspects of Sri Lanka’s current predicament: patrimonialism, militarization and 
emergency rule, and the role of civil society.  
 
Patrimonialism 
Although Sri Lanka has been a functioning electoral democracy after independence, this system has seen 
the continuation of patrimonial governance that preceded the advent of mass participation in democratic 
politics. Members of parliament have become central figures in delivering spoils handed out by the 
central state and political parties. Obeysekere (cited in 27, p.128) describes the situation in the early 
1970s:  
 
“Since jobs are scarce, all competitive or open methods of recruitment have been abandoned and 
the government M.P. of the area is given tremendous power in these appointments…Very often 
the person who gets the job is a kinsman of the M.P. or one who has access to the patronage 
system through elite connections.” 
 
These patterns run right through Sri Lanka’s system of governance. The lowest level officials – grama 
niladharis – are widely perceived to be corrupt (25), while clientelism is starkly played out within 
parliament – loyal MPs are rewarded with cabinet positions to the extent that there were 93 ministers 
from a total of 225 MPs in 2013, the largest cabinet in the world. Key political figures from opposition 
parties have frequently been offered financial incentives to cross-over to government benches (32). Since 
Mahinda Rajapakse took power in 2005, there has been a further concentration of power in the hands of 
the President and his close family members – his three brothers enjoy key positions within the 
government, and his son Namal is being groomed for high office. Patronage at all levels has served to 
undermine the equality of public service delivery and public trust in government. Growing clientelism 
during Rajapakse’s presidency appears to have been accompanied by growing corruption - Sri Lanka’s 
score in Transparency International’s corruption perception index fell from 3.7 in 2002 to 3.1 in 2009 
(32).  
 
Emergency governance and militarization 
Governance has been deeply affected by armed rebellion and war.   Uyangoda (25) depicts the state 
functioning in two ‘parallel modes - as a “normal” state through its institutions and practices of 
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democratic governance, and as a state at war, engaged in a protracted internal war with its own citizens’. 
He argues that these two ‘contradictory and mutually hostile processes’ existed side by side ‘one enabling 
the other’s continuous reproduction’. These two strands of governance emerged in the 1970s. The decline 
of the left in Sri Lanka left a vacuum that was filled with ethno-nationalist political currents in both the 
Tamil and Sinhalese polities. These forces produced armed rebellions led by the JVP in the South and by 
various Tamil separatist groups in the North. The state’s counter-insurgency response led to three 
decades of emergency rule between the early 1980s and 2011. During this time the powers of the security 
forces were strengthened and a culture of impunity developed. Another important enduring 
characteristic of Sri Lankan politics is the ‘symbiotic relationship between criminal gangs and politicians’, 
where ‘gang leaders need political protection and in return, carry out the dirty work for their patrons in 
dealing with opponents’ (33). One of the major consequences of this relationship has been repeated 
episodes of electoral violence (32).  
 
Although militarization has permeated society and politics across the island since the end of the war, its 
effects are most obvious in the North and East. During the war a complex hybrid system of governance 
emerged in LTTE-controlled areas. Stokke (34) provides a detailed analysis of the proto-state institutions 
established by the LTTE in the Northern Province which included border control posts, courts, police 
service, public services and economic development programmes. Between the LTTE’s emergence as the 
dominant actor in the Tamil polity in the late 1970s and the end of the war, Tamil nationalism has been 
primarily an authoritarian, militaristic phenomenon. In the post-war period, some limited space for 
democratic politics has opened up in the Tamil polity. Since the government of Sri Lanka wrested back 
control of the north and defeated the LTTE in 2009, however, its response has been driven by a concern 
with securing the North and preventing the re-emergence of militant groups. The Northern Province has 
been heavily militarized to such an extent that in 2012 one study estimated a ratio of one security 
personnel for around every five civilians (35). The military has maintained control over post-war 
administration of the North under the leadership of the provincial governor, a retired major general G.A. 
Chandrasiri, keeping close oversight of all humanitarian and development projects in the province. They 
have also taken over decision-making powers on contentious issues such as the allocation of land (36). 
Furthermore, the military has established a network of major base camps and cantonments, leading to 
widespread concerns from the civilian population about the durability of the military presence and a 
wider sense that a process of Sinhalization of the north is underway (37). 
 
There has been a broader erosion of democratic governance in the post-war period. In 2010, the 
eighteenth amendment to the constitution abolished the two-term limit on presidential office and giving 
the president final authority over the constitutional council which was responsible for making key 
appointments in the civil service and government commissions – further politicising the bureaucracy. The 
period since 2011 has seen further challenges to democracy – critics of the government continue to be 
suppressed, human rights violations have continued, and the independence of the judiciary has been 
further compromised by the impeachment of the chief justice in 2013 (38).  
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The limits of liberal civil society 
During the 2002-2006 peace process, many donor agencies envisaged that civil society in Sri Lanka could 
play an important peacebuilding role by building popular support for the peace process, improving social 
relations between ethnic groups, and promoting governance reform amongst policymakers. These 
expectations proved to be misguided for a number of reasons. First, as described above Sri Lankan 
politics is highly centralised, with limited room for national interests groups to influence the centre. The 
most influential civil society organizations have been those that have received direct support from the 
state or political parties. Second, since ethno-nationalism became the dominant mode of political 
mobilization during the post-independence period, civil society groups that mobilised along ethnic lines 
tended to be more successful than those that sought to transcend ethnic divisions. Third, the war itself 
limited scope for political dissent in both the southern and northern polities, with the state adopting a 
more hostile stance towards civil society organizations since the JVP uprisings in the late 1980s and the 
LTTE limiting space for critical Tamil civil society organizations in the North and East (39).  
 
These constraints on civil society were tightened after the war resumed in 2006. Since the end of the war 
in 2009, the defence ministry has taken control of the NGO secretariat, and become much more intimately 
involved in monitoring the activities of civil society (38). The government has placed strict limits on the 
types of activities that NGOs can engage in (40), while many human rights activists have faced 
intimidation. Violence against NGO workers and journalists peaked during the war, with the government 
implicated in the killings of 17 aid workers in Trincomalee in 2006 (41). These killings have declined in 
the post-war period, but intimidation and violent attacks on newspapers and civil society organizations 
continue and Sri Lanka remains one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists (42). 
 
 
Conclusion 
This brief overview of Sri Lanka’s post-independence history has highlighted three broader lessons that 
can be gleaned from the Sri Lankan case. First, rather than preventing ethnic violence and civil war, a 
democratic system in an ethnically diverse society that lacks sufficient safeguards for minority groups can 
in fact drive processes of inter-ethnic competition and cultural nationalism. Second, processes of 
economic and social development can also undermine social peace. As we have seen, state welfarism 
supported improvements health and educational outcomes, but at the same time helped to entrench 
patrimonial systems of governance which excluded marginalised groups. Third, state reform efforts have 
often compounded rather than assuaged these existing dynamics. The dominant strain of Sinhala 
nationalism propelled by ‘ethnic outbidding’ was reinforced by the new constitutions of 1972 and 1978. 
The other main consequence of these reforms was to empower the centre – a shift that laid the 
foundations for the Rajapakse regime and the slide towards authoritarianism that has been observed 
since 2005. 
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Together these lessons serve as a powerful rejoinder to mainstream perspectives on the relationships 
between democracy, market reform and conflict. Since the 1990s, the dominant model of external 
intervention in conflict-affected societies – often termed ‘liberal peacebuilding’ - has sought to promote 
democratization and economic liberalization as tools to support conflict resolution. This perspective has 
viewed its three main goals (political liberalization, economic liberalization and conflict resolution) as 
mutually supportive. The highly internationalised peacebuilding efforts led by Norway and various other 
western donors pursued between 2002 and 2006, which largely conformed to these principles, 
demonstrated several problems with this approach – economic reform alienated key peace constituencies 
in the South; heavy internationalization encouraged nationalists to mobilize against the peace process; 
and the strategy of using economic development as a means of boosting popular support and 
commitment from conflict parties backfired. This chapter has shown how these contemporary 
experiments in liberal peacebuilding have important continuities with a broader pattern within Sri 
Lanka’s history whereby efforts to import liberal institutions and economic strategies have led to illiberal 
outcomes. 
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